Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education [Game theory]

Registro completo de metadados
MetadadosDescriçãoIdioma
Autor(es): dc.creatorPolak, Ben-
Data de aceite: dc.date.accessioned2019-08-21T19:38:41Z-
Data de disponibilização: dc.date.available2019-08-21T19:38:41Z-
Data de envio: dc.date.issued2007-12-03-
Data de envio: dc.date.issued2010-04-06-
Data de envio: dc.date.issued2010-05-06-
Data de envio: dc.date.issued2010-05-06-
Data de envio: dc.date.issued2010-05-06-
Fonte completa do material: dc.identifierhttp://objetoseducacionais2.mec.gov.br/handle/mec/13886-
Fonte: dc.identifier.urihttp://educapes.capes.gov.br/handle/capes/496205-
Descrição: dc.descriptionEducação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia-
Descrição: dc.descriptionEducação Superior::Engenharias::Engenharia de Produção-
Descrição: dc.descriptionPresents part of course, Game theory , when Professor Polak compares two settings with asymmetric information; one side of a game knows something that the other side does not. Shows how always interpret attempts to communicate or signal such information taking into account the incentives of the person doing the signaling. The costly signals can sometimes provide incentives for agents with different information to distinguish themselves. Considers how the education system can allow future workers to signal their abilities-
Idioma: dc.languageen-
Publicador: dc.publisherYale University, Open Yale Courses-
Relação: dc.relationAsymmetric information.mp3-
Direitos: dc.rightsYale University 2009. Some rights reserved. Unless otherwise indicated in the applicable Credits section of certain lecture pages, all content on this web site is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Please refer to the Credits section to determine whether third-party restrictions on the use of content apply-
???dc.source???: dc.sourcehttp://oyc.yale.edu/economics/game-theory/contents/sessions.html-
Palavras-chave: dc.subjectEducação Superior::Engenharias::Engenharia de Produção::Teoria dos Jogos-
Palavras-chave: dc.subjectEducação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia::Economia Geral-
Palavras-chave: dc.subjectStrategy-
Palavras-chave: dc.subjectIncentive-
Palavras-chave: dc.subjectComunication-
Palavras-chave: dc.subjectCompetitiveness-
Título: dc.titleAsymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education [Game theory]-
Tipo de arquivo: dc.typeáudio-
???dc.description2???: dc.description2To show and understand the interpretation attempts to communicate or signal the incentives of the person doing the signaling-
???dc.description3???: dc.description3Duration: 1 h 10 min, 36 s. To hear this resource its necessary the instalation of Quick time. Available at: <http://www.apple.com/pt/quicktime/>-
Aparece nas coleções:Repositório Institucional - MEC BIOE

Não existem arquivos associados a este item.