Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing [Game theory]

Registro completo de metadados
MetadadosDescriçãoIdioma
Autor(es): dc.creatorPolak, Ben-
Data de aceite: dc.date.accessioned2019-08-21T19:38:41Z-
Data de disponibilização: dc.date.available2019-08-21T19:38:41Z-
Data de envio: dc.date.issued2007-11-28-
Data de envio: dc.date.issued2010-04-06-
Data de envio: dc.date.issued2010-05-06-
Data de envio: dc.date.issued2010-05-06-
Data de envio: dc.date.issued2010-05-06-
Fonte completa do material: dc.identifierhttp://objetoseducacionais2.mec.gov.br/handle/mec/13873-
Fonte: dc.identifier.urihttp://educapes.capes.gov.br/handle/capes/496204-
Descrição: dc.descriptionEducação Superior::Engenharias::Engenharia de Produção-
Descrição: dc.descriptionEducação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia-
Descrição: dc.descriptionPresents part of course, Game theory , when Professor Polak shows how in business or personal relationships, promises and threats of good and bad behavior tomorrow may provide good incentives for good behavior today, but, to work, these promises and threats must be credible. Presents the grim strategy forms such an equilibrium provided that we are patient and the game has a high probability of continuing. Discusses less draconian punishments, and find there is a trade off between the severity of punishments and the required probability that relationships will endure. Applies this idea to a moral-hazard problem that arises with outsourcing, and find that the high wage premiums found in foreign sectors of emerging markets may be reduced as these relationships become more stable-
Idioma: dc.languageen-
Publicador: dc.publisherYale University, Open Yale Courses-
Relação: dc.relationRepeated games 2.mp3-
Direitos: dc.rightsYale University 2009. Some rights reserved. Unless otherwise indicated in the applicable Credits section of certain lecture pages, all content on this web site is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Please refer to the Credits section to determine whether third-party restrictions on the use of content apply-
???dc.source???: dc.sourcehttp://oyc.yale.edu/economics/game-theory/contents/sessions.html-
Palavras-chave: dc.subjectEducação Superior::Engenharias::Engenharia de Produção::Teoria dos Jogos-
Palavras-chave: dc.subjectEducação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::Economia::Economia Geral-
Palavras-chave: dc.subjectIncentive-
Palavras-chave: dc.subjectPunishment-
Palavras-chave: dc.subjectStrategy-
Palavras-chave: dc.subjectCompetitiveness-
Título: dc.titleRepeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing [Game theory]-
Tipo de arquivo: dc.typeáudio-
???dc.description2???: dc.description2To discuss and understand punishments, incentives and behavior-
???dc.description3???: dc.description3Duration: 1 h, 15 min, 46 s. To hear this resource its necessary the instalation of Quick time. Available at: <http://www.apple.com/pt/quicktime/>-
Aparece nas coleções:Repositório Institucional - MEC BIOE

Não existem arquivos associados a este item.