

International Journal of Human Sciences Research

Acceptance date: 01/10/2024

Submission date: 29/09/2024

THE LOGIC OF VIOLENCE IN THE PRISONER REBELLION AT THE ALCAÇUZ PENITENTIARY/RN¹

Cristina Maria Quintão Carneiro

Universidade Estadual do Oeste

do Paraná/UNIOESTE, Social

Sciences Course, Toledo/PR

<http://lattes.cnpq.br/1433356214417365>

All content in this magazine is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License. Attribution-Non-Commercial-Non-Derivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).



1. Paper originally published in the Proceedings of the III International Seminar on Prison Research, September 2017

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze the prisoner rebellion that took place in January 2017 at the Dr. Francisco Nogueira Fernandes State Penitentiary (Alcaçuz) in Rio Grande do Norte/Brazil. The rebellion was characterized by a confrontation between rival criminal factions which resulted in the execution of prisoners and acts of extreme violence. The main form of execution used by the prisoners was beheading / decapitation with public display of the decapitated bodies. This case is seen as paradigmatic for discussing the current situation in the Brazilian prison system and for understanding the principles of violent sociability that govern criminal organizations in prisons.

Keywords: prison riots/ violent sociability/ criminal organizations

INTRODUCTION

This work deals with the largest prisoner rebellion in the state of Rio Grande do Norte, which took place in the Dr. Francisco Nogueira Fernandes State Penitentiary (Alcaçuz), from January 14 to 27, 2017. The rebellion was characterized by conflict between rival criminal factions, resulting in violence between the prisoners themselves with murders and acts of cruelty.

Given this scenario, the challenge of this work is to ask about the logic of violence that characterizes this Rebellion in Alcaçuz. This case is seen as paradigmatic for the discussion of the current situation in the Brazilian prison system and for understanding the principles of violent sociability that govern criminal organizations in prisons.

Prison riots are complex phenomena that reveal not only the weaknesses of the prison system, but also the power dynamics between rival criminal groups. These events can be seen as an opportunity for demonstrations of force and control. In Brazil, the typical form has been through extreme violence, cruelty

and a game of visibility typical of the ritual of torture described by Foucault (Dias, 2017: 92).

A characteristic shared by most of the so-called Brazilian criminal “factions” is that almost all of them emerge, consolidate and spread through prisons. Initially as a movement, an organization of prisoners to later become criminal collectives with extramural interests (Coelho, 1987; Manso e Dias, 2018; Biondi 2018; Feltran 2018).

In the case of Alcaçuz, the rebellion gave visibility to the situation in which the state and the prison administration do not have effective control of the prison, do not fulfill their primary function of legitimate monopoly of force, nor do they carry out their task of supervising penal execution and delegate the management of prison routines to the leaders of the criminal groups. This creates favorable conditions for the non-legitimate or non-legal exercise of violence.

The approach proposed here is to discuss the problem of violence and the actions of criminal groups inside prisons based on the notion of violent sociability elaborated by Machado da Silva (2007; 2006; 2004a, 2004b; 1995; 1994).

Violent sociability is a notion “from which it is suggested that drug gangs have constituted a form of autonomous life, at the core of which are dispositions and behaviors that reduce intersubjectivity to almost nothing and for which physical force (with the objects that amplify it) is the only reference” (Machado da Silva, 2004). The concept of violent sociability will be considered as an analytical key for reflection and analysis of the case of violence in the Alcaçuz Rebellion.

The main sources used for the case study are documents obtained from the report of the National Mechanism to Combat Torture of the Ministry of Justice-Federal Government, the result of a technical visit to Alcaçuz Prison in March 2017, reports from the National

Prison Pastoral and the Rio Grande do Norte Prison Pastoral (entities linked to the Catholic Church); a report from the National Council of Justice on prison lethality and secondary data obtained from the Penitentiary Censuses of the National Penitentiary Department (DEPEN). We also compiled a chronology of the Rebellion, using press reports from the national newspaper O Globo and the main local newspaper A Tribuna do Norte.

The text is organized as follows: first, an analytical description of the pre-rebellion scenario will be carried out in order to contextualize the existing conditions in the Alcaçuz Penitentiary that enhance or condition practices related to violent sociability. In topic two, the focus is on the Rebellion, described through a brief chronology that highlights the fundamental elements characteristic of the rebellion. This will be followed by an analysis of the case, using the notion of violent sociability as an analytical key to understanding the internal order and conflicts that generated the rebellion. Finally, the conclusions and recommendations.

PRE-REBELLION SCENARIO

This topic will highlight the fundamental characteristics of the Alcaçuz Penitentiary, typical of places where people are deprived of their liberty, in terms of the way it is organized, how it works and the guarantee of rights that interfere with power relations inside the prison.

The Alcaçuz Penitentiary is located in the municipality of Nísia Floresta, in Greater Natal, and is the largest penitentiary in Rio Grande do Norte. It was built in 1980 and has an official capacity for 620 prisoners, and was holding 1,100 men on January 14 (the day the rebellion began). In 2010, an annex building was built, the Rogério Coutinho Madruga Prison (Pavilion 5), with a capacity for 402 prisoners, holding a total of 450 prisoners

on January 14 (DEPEN, 2017). Therefore, a situation of overcrowding, aggravated by the precarious conditions of the physical facilities, as we will see below.

The Alcaçuz Penitentiary has a history of rebellions, conflicts and escapes since it was built. The biggest rebellions took place in 2015 and 2016. They were motivated by inmates' demands for basic conditions for survival in prison, such as: better food, improved physical facilities, access to medical care, job opportunities, regulation of family visits and legal assistance through the Public Defender's Office. These demands have not been met and the rebellions have caused damage to structures and physical facilities. During the 2015 rebellion, the bars and padlocks of the cells were destroyed and since then the prisoners have been left loose inside the pavilions, without the entry of prison guards (MNPCT, 2017).

In terms of forms of organization and functioning, the MNPCT (2017) reveals that since the 2015 rebellion, until March 2017, the state has not fulfilled its obligations to:

Controlling the number and distribution of inmates, without exact data on those who are in each pavilion,

Guaranteed basic supplies, such as a place to sleep and access to water;

Receiving direct demands from inmates on health issues, legal assistance, as well as ensuring treatment for inmates.

A fundamental aspect reported by the MNPCT concerns the institutional organization of the Alcaçuz penitentiary, which is based on the division between criminal groups (factions). Before the rebellion, the administration distributed the inmates in the pavilions according to the factions that the inmates themselves claimed to belong to or according to whether they belonged to any of these groups. In pavilions 1, 2 and 4 would be the majority faction in the

state called the RN Crime Syndicate (SDC/RN). In pavilion 5 would be those belonging to a minority faction called the First Capital Command (PCC). And in pavilion 3 there are those who declare themselves to have no faction. In other words, the logic of conflict between factions has become an institutional criterion for sorting and separating prisoners within the penitentiary.

This institutional treatment of people deprived of their liberty violates the provisions of the Penal Execution Law and the international guidelines of the Subcommittee to Combat Torture, both of which state that prisons should be run by technical prison staff and not by prisoners. Rule 11 of the Mandela Rules mentions that the separation of prisoners should be based on objective criteria, such as gender, age, criminal record and reasons for detention. And article 84 of the Penal Execution Law (LEP) states that sentenced prisoners must be kept separate from those who have not yet been tried, and also determines the criteria for separating provisional and sentenced prisoners.

In Alcaçuz, in addition to the lack of basic necessities, the management of daily life in the pavilions is the responsibility of the prisoners themselves, which makes it possible to create extralegal and illegal rules and strengthens the actions of criminal groups who, in this microcosm, reproduce actions whose logic is distrust and violence.

These are conditions that have been part of the inmates' daily lives for around two years:

- The state government did not guarantee the distribution of basic hygiene items. This became the responsibility of the inmates' families and visitors. These items are allowed in once a week. Up to 15 kilos of material are allowed per visitor, ranging from food, cleaning and hygiene materials to plastic bottles of drinking water.

- Water is supplied three times a day, for an average of 30 minutes each time, totaling 90 minutes of water a day. Inmates have to take turns to use the tap in other cells, as well as to use the toilets. The water is not drinkable.

- In Alcaçuz, sleeping on a bed in a cell sheltered from the rain and sun and with access to a bathroom are valuable resources, the use of which is defined by the prisoners themselves and by the leaders of the criminal groups.

Faced with the lack of cell division, prisoners organize themselves by occupying both the cells and the corridors and halls of the pavilions, where there are up to 50 prisoners without adequate protection from rain and sunlight (MNPCT, 2017). The cells have become privileged spaces because they have bathrooms and roofs. The false appearance of being free inside the pavilion hides a reality of oppression in which the strongest determine the spatial distribution inside the prison and the strongest benefit from the existing resources.

- The state's failure to distribute basic survival items burdens prisoners' families and creates vulnerability for inmates who do not receive visitors, or those who are deprived of such goods or depend on other prisoners, opening the door to threats, embarrassment and extortion.

It is worth noting that Campos Coelho (2005) already drew attention to this aspect in 1983, in his pioneering study on the prison system in Rio de Janeiro

“As the state does not meet, or poorly meets, the basic needs of inmates, an economy has developed within each prison that is in every way irregular and illegal. Everything is sold and bought, money is lent and the most varied objects are pawned” (COELHO, 2005, p. 73-74).

Another fundamental aspect also neglected by the state concerns meeting prisoners' demands for legal assistance and medical treatment (Godoi, 2017).

The issue of overcrowding at Alcaçuz, when exposed to procedural review within the criminal justice system, revealed yet another common characteristic of the Brazilian prison context.

The joint task force carried out by Defensoria Sem Fronteiras for a massive procedural review within the justice system of the cases of prisoners in Alcaçuz found that 696 people imprisoned in Alcaçuz should not be in a closed regime. In other words, 49% of Alcaçuz's prison population is wrongly imprisoned. More than three thousand cases of prisoners in all the pavilions of Alcaçuz were analyzed and 1,303 individual consultations were carried out. As part of this action, 183 requests for sentence rectification were made, 126 requests for regime progression, 79 requests for conditional release, 23 pardons, six extinctions of sentence, 18 habeas corpus, 11 requests for release, 11 requests for prescription, and one request for house arrest. (MNTC, 2017)

THE ALCAÇUZ REBELLION: A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY

The Alcaçuz rebellion lasted fourteen days and resulted in 26 official deaths and 64 missing persons. The MNPCT highlights the lack of structure and control on the part of the prison authorities in relation to the dead and wounded. Initial reports were that there had been more than 100 deaths. However, 26

2. Videos taken from inside the Alcaçuz penitentiary show inmates around a bonfire, which they say is burning human body parts. The government claims that there is no record of cannibalism at the site, but acknowledges the veracity of the images. In one of the videos, a prisoner appears burning pieces of meat and skin that he says are from a human body, stuck on a piece of rebar. One of them warns: "PCC barbecue". The camera then turns to the inmates, who are not afraid to show their faces. They inform us that they are from Pavilion 2, controlled by the RN Crime Syndicate, and are avenging deaths that took place in Pavilion 4, committed by rival members of the PCC (First Command of the Capital). In another video, a forearm is placed on a spit while a prisoner narrates the events: "we are here on another day of war in the Alcaçuz penitentiary". In the background, dozens of inmates approach and what appears to be a mutilated body is dragged away, tied up with a sheet. (O Dia newspaper, January 23, 2017)

deaths inside the prison have been officially confirmed. But this figure could be higher, because there is no official number of missing persons. The state government had no protocols or means of maintaining routines within the units, so it was unable to reliably demonstrate who the inmates were, where they were and how they were doing.

The rebellion was marked by serious violations of rights, torture and killings with characteristics of dismemberment, decapitation, concealment of corpses, incineration of bodies and allegations of cannibalism, reinforced by videos (2) posted on social networks. Beheading is one of the PCC's hallmarks in the executions of rivals, especially when it comes to members of other organizations (Dias 2017:93). And dismemberment has been identified as a hallmark of the Família do Norte (FDN) allied to the RN Crime Syndicate, rivals of the PCC.

The rebellion broke out on January 14, 2017, around 5pm, after visiting hours. The conflict began when prisoners from the Rogério Coutinho Madrugá Penitentiary/Pavilion 5 (members of the First Command of the Capital / PCC), invaded Pavilion 4 and clashed with prisoners from the rival faction identified with the Rio Grande do Norte Crime Syndicate (SDC). The motives were a dispute over internal territory and reprisal for the deaths of PCC prisoners by the rival faction Família do Norte (FDN), which took place in December 2016 at the Anísio Jobim Penitentiary Complex (Compaj), in Amazonas. (CARVALHO, G1:14/07/2017).

After this incident, for around twelve hours the prison was in a *state of war*, without any action by the state to calm it down. The following day, on the morning of January 15, the Military Police's Shock Battalion entered the unit and began to control the outside area of the prison, but inside the prison the rebellion continued for thirteen days.

One of the actions taken by the Rio Grande Norte state government to contain the rebellion was the transfer of 220 prisoners from the SDC to the Parnamirim State Penitentiary. This action on January 18 triggered a violent reaction from the Sindicato do Crime faction³ inside and outside the prison. On the same day, 15 buses and an official car were set on fire in the city of Natal. Two police stations were shot at and stoned. Outside the prison, inmates' wives set up a barricade, setting fire to a sofa and garbage.

Inside the prison, the day after the transfer of prisoners, on February 19, another rebellion broke out. Inmates from both factions took up residence on the roofs, burned mattresses and used machetes and other bladed weapons in the clashes. After this second day of clashes, the death and injury toll has not been finalized (O DIA/IG, 19/01/2017)

Bodies were decapitated, dismembered, buried inside cells with sand floors, or thrown into pits and wells. Other bodies have been burned and family members have reported cannibalism. The MNPCT reports operational difficulties with forensics and the identification of bodies. There was a demand for genetic identification of charred bodies and body parts, but the IML does not have a DNA laboratory for human identification, so the IML did not identify any bodies through DNA testing.

The final result of the rebellion was the destruction of the prison's already precarious structures. Walls and roofs were destroyed. Pavilion 3 - was burned down on January 19, the walls graffitied with the initials of the factions.

The rebellion was brought to an end on January 27, with federal intervention through the Penitentiary Intervention Task Force (FTIP) of the National Penitentiary Department, created by the Ministry of Justice. This Task Force was made up of federal penitentiary agents and state and Federal District penitentiary agents and took over the custody, security and overall management of Pavilion 5 and adjacent facilities. The Task Force was made up of 87 correctional officers: 47 federal prison officers and 40 state prison officers (from Rio de Janeiro, Ceará and the Federal District). Thus, through the work of the National Penitentiary Department, the state began to establish basic routines, such as identifying inmates, providing health care and receiving complaints. Another emergency action taken by the state to contain the rebellion was the physical separation of pavilions 4 and 5 from the others, by means of a wall. (Tavares, Zauli, Carvalho and Macedo; G1, 14/02/2017).

In March 2017, the MNPCT team identified the following problems in Alcaçuz that require immediate resolution: staff shortages, overcrowding, lack of health care, few opportunities for reprieve, proper identification and separation of prisoners, and the violation of visitors through vexatious searches. The vexatious search is legally forbidden, but is common practice in Alcaçuz. It consists of a search suffered by families when they visit prisoners, having to stand completely naked in front of prison guards,

3. The withdrawal of RN members from Alcaçuz could represent a kind of victory for the PCC, since the two factions had been demanding the departure of the rival group since the beginning of this confrontation. The women's rebellion outside the prison points to this feeling of defeat for the majority faction in RN. It is also the result of a more practical issue: the families of the transferred inmates are already used to going to Alcaçuz for visits. Many women were already calculating how much more they would spend if they had to go to Parnamirim."

forced to stand under a mirror and manipulate their genitals in search of illicit objects.

Action for Citizenship and Justice, through the Ombudsman of the National Penitentiary System, recorded that the main complaints include: 1) lack of hygiene material, food, clothing, medication, mattresses, sandals, etc., 2) communication and visits with family members and 3) clarification about the physical safety of prisoners after the rebellion.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL CHALLENGE: ANALYZING THE VIOLENCE OF REBELLION

The Alcaçuz Rebellion presented a characteristic that has been present in the Brazilian prison system since the 1990s, pointed out by Salla (2006) and already analyzed in previous studies, which is the strong influence of criminal groups in determining daily practices in the prison environment and rebellions with deaths (Biondi, 2010; Dias, 2011; Manso and Dias, 2018; Feltran 2018). What is new is that these deaths and violence are the result of the actions of the prisoners themselves and are caused by internal conflicts and disputes between criminal groups. In other words, they are situations in which there is no “pacification between equals (a reduction in the use of open violence between peers), reorienting violent practices towards the outside” (Machado da Silva, 2004, p. 76) and this brings us back to the notion of violent sociability, which can shed light on understanding the violence characteristic of rebellion.

For Machado da Silva, violence has been transformed from a “socially regulated and minimized means of obtaining interests, into the center of a pattern of sociability in formation” (MACHADO DA SILVA, 1999, p. 117). This new form of sociability is characterized by the establishment of a pattern of social relations (and not isolated

acts of criminals) based on the qualitative transformation of violence from a means of obtaining interest to a “principle of regulating social relations”.

This means that there is a logic to the use of force as a principle, the use of force as a means of achieving the submission of the other.

In the author’s words:

“Insofar as the principle that structures social relations is force, there is no room for distinction between the spheres of politics, economics and morality. In the same way, one can characterize the agents responsible for the genesis and consolidation of this order as a kind of borderline case in the development of individualism, in which the abandonment of collective references that moderate the pursuit of individual interests also ends up eliminating self-control.” (Machado, 2004)

In the analysis of the Alcaçuz Rebellion, we can consider that criminals orient themselves according to their own pattern of sociability, resulting in violent forms of control and submission of the prison masses. The submission imposed by the agents of “violent sociability” cancels out the relationship of otherness and the recognition of the humanity of the other prisoner. Violence is the principle of action, which is why it needs no justification.

CONCLUSIONS

The first conclusion refers to the issue of violence within the prison system. This is a much-discussed issue in Brazil, especially when analyzing how the state exercises its monopoly on violence and fulfills its classic functions of pacifying social relations in the context of the Brazilian prison system (Salla, 2006; Adorno and Salla, 2007, Biondi, 2010; Dias, 2011). From this perspective, the Alcaçuz Rebellion is paradigmatic and reveals that the role of the state as a security provider has been delegitimized, either due to the inefficiency of state institutions to guarantee civil

rights and fundamental principles of respect for the physical integrity of imprisoned individuals.

It is considered that the violence between prisoners themselves, in the recurring riots with deaths, indicates that the authorities are not being able to maintain order and control over prison life, allowing prisoners and criminal groups to provoke conflicts and confrontations with both other prisoners and the authorities.

This leads to a second conclusion, since there is a combination of factors that have made Alcaçuz the worst of the worst worlds and contributed to creating the conditions for

violent sociability.

As described in the article, the Alcaçuz Penitentiary is a prison without the minimum conditions necessary for the dignified confinement of human beings. Added to these conditions are reports of experiences of submission, humiliation, beatings, murders and rapes; common in this prison context marked by the presence of criminal collectives/agents of “violent sociability”. Under these conditions, prison serves as a base for criminal dynamics that go beyond prison walls and establish themselves in urban territories in Brazilian cities (Godoi, 2017; Muniz, 2022).

REFERENCES

- ADORNO, Sérgio [e] SALLA, Fernando. “Criminalidade organizada nas prisões e os ataques do PCC”. 2007, *Estudos Avançados*, no 61, pp. 7-29.
- CARVALHO, Fred. Detentos fazem rebelião em presídio do RN. G1, 14/01/2017, 18h38.
- COELHO, Edmundo Campos. *A oficina do diabo e outros estudos sobre criminalidade*. 2005 (1ª edição 1987). Rio de Janeiro, Record.
- DIAS, Camila Caldeira Nunes. *Da pulverização ao monopólio da violência: expansão e consolidação do Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) no sistema carcerário paulista*. 2011, São Paulo, 386 pp. Tese de doutorado. Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas da Universidade de São Paulo.
- DIAS, Camila Caldeira Nunes. Estado e PCC em meio às tramas do poder arbitrário nas prisões. *Tempo Social*, 2011, v. 23, n. 2, p. 213-233,
- DIAS, Camila Caldeira Nunes. “Ocupando as brechas do direito formal: o PCC como instância alternativa de resolução de conflitos.” *Dilemas-Revista de Estudos de Conflito e Controle Social*, 2017, pp. 83-106.
- BIONDI, Karina. *Junto e misturado: uma etnografia do PCC*. 2010, São Paulo, terceiro nome.
- FELTRAN, Gabriel. “Margens da política, fronteiras da violência: uma ação coletiva das periferias em São Paulo”. 2010, *Lua Nova*, São Paulo, n. 79:201-233.
- FOUCAULT, Michel. *Vigiar e punir: história da violência nas prisões*. Petrópolis, Vozes. (2000),
- FOUCAULT, Michel. *Microfísica do poder*. Rio de Janeiro, Graal. 2003
- GARLAND, David. (1999), “As contradições da sociedade punitiva: o caso britânico”. *Revista de Sociologia e Política*, Curitiba, 13: 59-80, nov.
- GODOI, Rafael. *Fluxos em cadeia: as prisões em São Paulo na virada dos tempos*. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2017.
- MACHADO DA SILVA, Luiz Antônio. . Criminalidade violenta: por uma nova perspectiva de análise. *Revista de Sociologia e Política*, 1999, Curitiba, 13, p. 115-124, nov.
- MACHADO DA SILVA, Luiz Antônio. Sociabilidade violenta: por uma interpretação da criminalidade contemporânea no Brasil urbano. 2004, *Sociedade e Estado*, Brasília, v. 19, n. 1, p. 53-84, jan./jun.
- MACHADO DA SILVA, Luiz Antônio. Sobre “Violência Hoje”. 2007, In: *Ciência & Saúde Coletiva*, vol. 11(Sup.): 1154-1161.

MACHADO DA SILVA, Luiz Antônio. *Vida sob cerco: violência e rotina nas favelas do Rio de Janeiro*. 2008, Rio de Janeiro, Nova Fronteira.

MACHADO DA SILVA, Luiz Antônio. “Violência urbana”, segurança pública e favelas - o caso do Rio de Janeiro atual. 2010, *Caderno CRH*, Salvador, v. 23, n. 59, p. 283-300, maio/ago.

MISSE, Michel. Crime organizado e crime comum no Rio de Janeiro: diferenças e afinidades. 2011, *Revista de Sociologia e Política*, 19(40), 13-25.

MISSE, Michel. “Mercados ilegais, redes de proteção e organização local do crime no Rio de Janeiro”. 2007, *Estudos Avançados*, 61(21), pp. 139-157, set.-out.

MISSE, Michel. “As ligações perigosas: mercado informal ilegal, narcotráfico e violência no Rio”. 1997, *Contemporaneidade e Educação*, 2 (1): 93-116, mar.

O DIA/IG. Guerra sem fim no RN: Alcaçuz tem nova rebelião. 19/01/2017, disponível em: < <http://odia.ig.com.br/brasil/2017-01-19/guerra-sem-fim-no-rn-alcacuz-tem-nova-rebeliao.html>>. Acesso em 03 de julho 2024

PAIXÃO, Antônio Luiz. *Recuperar ou punir? Como o Estado trata o criminoso*. 1997, São Paulo: Cortez.

PAIXÃO, Antônio L. “Crime, Controle Social e Consolidação da Democracia: as metáforas da cidadania”. In: REIS, F.W. e O’DONNELL, G.(orgs.) *A Democracia no Brasil: dilemas e perspectivas*. 1998, São Paulo. Vértice/Ed.Tribunais. p.168-199.

RAMALHO, José Ricardo. *O mundo do crime: a ordem pelo avesso*. 2002 (1ª edição 1979). São Paulo, IBCCRIM.

SALLA, Fernando. “As rebeliões nas prisões: novos significados a partir da experiência brasileira”. 2006, *Sociologias*, 16: 274-307, jul. -dez.

SYKES, Gresham. (1974), *The society of captives: a study of a maximum security prison*. New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

TAVARES, Andrea, ZAULI, Fernanda, CARVALHO, Fred e MACEDO, Thyago. Especial 1 mês do massacre em Alcaçuz. *Jornal O Globo*, G1, 14/02/2017. Disponível em: <http://especiais.g1.globo.com/rn/rio-grande-do-norte/2017/1-mes-do-massacre-em-alcacuz/>. Acesso em 10 de julho de 2024.

DOCUMENTOS

BRASIL. Lei nº 7.210, de 11 de julho de 1984. (Institui a Lei de Execução Penal). *Diário Oficial [da] República Federativa do Brasil, Poder Executivo, Brasília, DF, 11 jul. 1984*.

BRASIL, Ministério da Justiça, Departamento Penitenciário Nacional, “Levantamento de Informações Penitenciárias: Infopen – dezembro de 2014 (disponível em http://www.justica.gov.br/seus-direitos/politica-penal/infopen_dez14.pdf).

BRASIL, Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ): http://www.cnj.jus.br/inspecao_penal/mapa.php, consultado em 27 de junho de 2017.

Mecanismo Nacional de Prevenção e Combate à Tortura (MNPCT), “Relatório Anual 2015-2016”, Brasília, 2015.

BRASIL, Ministério de Direitos Humanos, Mecanismo Nacional de Prevenção e Combate à Tortura (MNPCT), *Relatório de Missão a Unidades de Privação de Liberdade do Rio Grande do Norte*, Brasília, abril de 2017, (191 p.).

CONSELHO NACIONAL DO MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO. *A visão do Ministério Público sobre o sistema prisional brasileiro – 2016*. Brasília: CNMP, 2016. Disponível em: <<https://www.cnmp.mp.br/portal/publicacoes/9948-a-visao-do-ministerio-publico-sobre-o-sistema-prisional-brasileiro-2016o>>. Acesso em: 29 jun. 2024.

BRASIL. CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, CNJ. *Dados das inspeções nos estabelecimentos penais*. Disponível em < http://www.cnj.jus.br/inspecao_penal/mapa.php>. Acesso em: 20 set. 2024.

Declaração do VI Encontro Latino-americano da Pastoral Carcerária (<http://carceraria.org.br/declaracao-do-vi-encontro-de-pastoral-carceraria>) e Carta da Assembleia Nacional 2016 da Pastoral Carcerária (<http://carceraria.org.br/carta-da-assembleia-2016-o-sonho-de-deus-um-mundo-sem-carceres.html>).

DEPEN — Departamento Penitenciário Nacional. *Levantamento Nacional de Informações Penitenciárias*. (Atualização, junho de 2016). Brasília: Ministério da Justiça, 2017.

Nota da Pastoral Carcerária: Não é crise, é projeto. São Paulo, janeiro 2017 <http://carceraria.org.br>