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**BOLSONARO STYLE
AND ANTI-POLITICS:
FROM DENIAL TO
EXALTATION OF THE
BRAZILIAN MILITARY
DICTATORSHIP¹**

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CONSIDERATIONS

In recent years, we have seen or increased authoritarian escalation in the country, promoted both by representatives of the State and by organized groups of civil society. Seeking to contribute to the debate on the current Brazilian political context, in September 2020, I presented a lecture on “Negationism and Anti-Politics” in the *Mora in Philosophy in Pandemic Extension Project*, linked to the Philosophy Course of the Federal University of Alagoas (MORAIS, 2020a).

I do not present a text, I try to systematize in a didactic way some of the ideas debated in my speech non-event, focusing, in particular, on aspects related to the Bolsonaro style person (anti) political project. Therefore, in the first section, I analyze the possibility of considering the Brazilian President a populist politician; in the second, I endorse the social representation of Bolsonaro style; Finally, on the third day, I discuss in an emphatic way a set of affirmations by the Brazilian State Chef in relation to the Military Dictatorship (1964 to 1985) and the use of violence in politics and public security.

WOULD BOLSONARO BE A POPULIST POLITICIAN?

For rhetoric, politics and the institutional place, which is not exercised in public, as a means of involving governors, representatives and citizens in collective decisions. To do so, seek-se (1) or debate between the Proponent

and the Opponent in order to persuade the Third Party (Auditorium); (2) choice - deliberation - of the best proposal with a focus on collective well-being; (3) or space of adjustment between or universal or plural; (4) to the denaturation of extra-political differences within the political field, so that the force of argument exceeds the force of coercion; (5) the elaboration of consensus as a goal regarding dissent as a guarantee of difference and democratic plurality ².

In his presentation of *Mora in Philosophy*, Professor José André Ribeiro (RIBEIRO, 2020) reflected on the relationship between Socrates and Juri, deducing from the clash between the philosopher and the polis some of the fundamentals for thinking about contemporary politics. Among them, (a) to disobedience to the laws, destruction of their own laws; (b) to the task of the philosopher – and of the scientist, we increased is to tell the truth (parrhesia); (c) the epistemic attack (reflected thought) as a doxa (common sense) is necessary for the democratic movement; (d) or anti-intellectualism is a symptom of crisis in the polis; (e) authoritarian regimes make philosophy unfeasible – and science, we increased.

The Brasil do Governo Bolsonaro seems to fit clearly into each of these aspects. The President’s continuous attacks on institutions contribute to weakening the State of Law. When the citizens passam to no longer accredit the state regulation of group relations, violence ³tends to supplant negotiation and

² Regarding the difference between the politician and politics, Emediato (2016, p. 20. Emphasis by the author) ponders: “The politician says respect for institutions, the reasons for the State and everything that allows a group of people to gather under the mantle of a collectivity, the community. Politics concerns everything that settles the relationship between governors, representatives and citizens. In this sense, trust proves to be a fundamental concept. Without it, the tie is lost in politics against or its point of degeneration”. In addition, for Amossy (2017, p. 19): “A deliberation, as we know, is a central piece of an ancient discipline founded on the investigation of two means capable of persuading or hearing: rhetoric. As a matter of fact, argumentative rhetoric is presented as the art of negotiating differences in order to reach an agreement. [...] It is precisely taking the search for an agreement that intervenes in deliberation, that is concretized in no discourse and no political debate, politics in a broad sense: everything that says respect for public affairs and the community”.

³ We referred to the typology of violence developed by Drawin (2011, p. 27-8. Its emphasis), which, in addition to defining bloody violence (a physical face of violence), proposes “systemic violence, which silently neutralizes political life to subjugate individuals to the logic of work (work) to the detriment of the action [...]”; socio - symbolic violence that blocks the possibility

respect for differences, essential to peaceful coexistence and so that ideological conflicts do not result in personalist and unilateral resolutions by those who possess greater political and economic power in society (AVRITZER, 2020; NOBRE, 2020).

It is also notorious for persecuting the National Executive Chef to Science and Universities (CARTA CAMPINAS, 2021)⁴, claiming to reduce the legitimacy and credibility of the same in relation to knowledge validated philosophically and scientifically. To deconstruct the authorities of the organs in the production of what we can call truth regimes, or President Jair Bolsonaro seeks to hypertrophy his own power of production of truth. If science would supposedly be reduced to a political institution, or political representative, not the other way around, it would directly become a scientific authority, interfering with the *modus operandi* of the production of knowledge and tracing for itself the responsibility of telling whether it is true or denouncing or false. (MORAIS, 2021).

The epistemic attack with a *doxa*, as Ribeiro (2020) affirms, is necessary for the democratic movement of the polis, at the same time that expresses an asymmetry between political/economic power and theoretical power in times of intense social crisis. I know, on the one hand, the responsibility of two lovers of knowledge – philosophers – in confronting the beliefs of the common sense is fundamental so that the public sphere can make the best decisions towards being collective; Of other, to place in sheikh beliefs fundamental to the identities of the masses and their emotions, philosophers and scientists can be considered their main public enemies. In this bias, or anti-intellectualism is fundamentally based on

of self-reflection and the search for common meaning in life; ontological violence as an unforeseeable and uncontrollable result of the self-reproduction of two techno-scientific and economic systems causing the destruction of nature in its phenomenal richness and in its integrity in itself (*physis*) and the destruction of culture in its moral expression and in its value to us (*ethos*), which are the two equioriginal experiences of the human being”.

4 For a view of the question of historical fascism and our current molds, see Stanley (2019).

5 About the relationship between rhetoric tests – *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos* – and political discourse, see Amossy & Koren (2016)

attacks and persecution, mobilizing all types of violence, free-thinking activities, especially in moments of acute social crisis.

For Professor Fabio Gentile (2020), the concept of power is based on modern democracy, founded on the ideas of representation and institutional mediation. In the opposite movement, or anchored populism (i) rejects two traditional processes of political representation, I propose a return to direct democracy as a way to supplant institutional logic; (ii) the definition of traditional politics as corrupt and ineffective; (iii) the centrality of politics in the figure of a charismatic leader, or who positions himself as an outsider of the system; (iv) do not use their own political structures to destroy politics; (v) in anti-politics, that is, in denial of any debate, negotiation and agreement with a party considered “enemy”; (vi) the elaboration of a group, defined as brave, honest and good, in diametric opposition to an *Eles*, a symbol of illness, of banditagem and evil; (vii) emerges from the emptiness of liberal democracy, and can be considered a kind of democratic pathology.

To these aspects, we add the following populist argumentative strategies: (I) to demagoguery (*ad populum* arguments), as a constant remission to the “people” to solve institutional problems; (II) or strong appeal to fear (*ad metum* arguments) and to pity (*ad mercy* arguments), in order to confuse emotions with values; (III) the disqualification of the other (*ad hominem* arguments); (IV) or focus on specific values of a group to the detriment of the universal; (V) or *ethos* or image if it surpasses or *logos* or political rationality; (VI) The logic of war as the constant need to raise the public enemy⁵.

What would be, then, the difference between “populist government” and “popular government”? And when does a government stop being “populist” to become “(neo) fascist”? These are two questions that, still, we cannot solve in our short space. As a solution, we have a proposal that is intended to aggregate: the level of use of violence in politics. In this sense, we align ourselves with the perspective of Souza (2019), so that Bolsonarism is linked to neofascism, and not to populism.

If any government that refers to “povo” or intends to be “popular” is automatically framed in the “populist” category, on one side, the metric of the use of violence in the destruction of politics is lost; On the other hand, there is the risk of considering the explicitly elitist governments and excluding the ideal political models, once the alignment with the concept of people would function as a negative pole of governance. It is possible, therefore, to exist without being populist popular governments.

Finally, let us summarize the authoritarian regimes – populist and neo-fascist, depending on the depth of use of two different types of violence – to dominate critical knowledge and supplant ideological conflicts in societies at times of threat to the status quo. In this logic, politics (regulated debate of dissonant voices at a public dinner) must become monolithic (a single voice authorized to speak and decide); or diffuse, centralized power; the opening to the other, median; to solidarity, hate. It seeks to channel the socially repressed resentments to persecute the most fragile social groups,

and Plantin (2016). Not that he says I respect the common argumentative fallacies of populism, as we associate with neofascism, Emediato (2016, p. 33-4. Italics of the author) highlights: “I appeal to the people (ad populum) and attack the opponent (ad hominem) mix in a speech full of violations as the rules of an ideal discussion. [...] Fallacies ad populum is frequently associated with other fallacies, such as fallacies ad hominem (attack the adversary), ad metum (appeal to the media), ad misericordiam (appeal to mercy) and their essential elements of the emotional argument and populism, especially when politicians find themselves in a delicate situation in their mandates or are denounced”.

6 About the relation of the enunciative structure We x They and the organization of fascist and neo-fascist movements, see Stanley (2018). I do not case two separatist discourses in Brazil, see Barros (2007). In the specific case of Bolsonarism, confer Morais (2021).

transforming “political rhetoric” into “war rhetoric”. A Us x Them is established, as dichotomous groups and irreconcilable with each other⁶.

A POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVENESS OF ANTI-POLITICS NOT BRAZIL

“[...]I think that, as well as violence, or fanaticism, it is also a permanent component of human nature, a ‘ruin gene’ that exists in all of us”, states the Israeli writer Amós Oz (2016, p. 18). In our opinion, the naturalistic approaches to violence and fanaticism do not manage to explain how complex social structures and moral practices vary over time and in different cultures can be restricted to a genetic component. In addition, as much as the causes, it is necessary to explain the processes of development and reproduction of intolerance and its consequences, as well as why of its generalized emergence in specific contexts.

The supposed biological cause remains unexplained why marginal positions in a given conjuncture tend to become hegemonic in others, both including new groups in violent practices and excluding others. In this perspective, intolerance would be linked not to our genes, but to specific sociocultural practices of certain groups, being symbolized in the language as imaginary forms of perception and organization of the real lived.

The naturalization of “violence” and “fanaticism”, via “gene bad”, therefore, although it can be interpreted as a figure of speech, it can teach transcendent meanings to such

phenomena, losing sight of the historicity and complexity of these concepts and practices. This way, we must always question ourselves about what it commits and what it suffers with these actions, as well as about its properties, because they are linked to historical/contingent symbolic markers that found the dichotomies “other”, “included/excluded”, “right/wrong”, basically, “good/bad”.

Let's take President Jair Bolsonaro as an example or himself. During his seven terms as Federal Deputy, he was considered a politician without mass representation, in 2018, he managed to be promoted to the position of Chef of State of the country, having received 57,796,986 votes, or equivalent to 39% of two Brazilian voters (COSTA, 2018). However, even within his group of voters, there is no unconditional support for their attitudes, once there are internal variations in the ideological spectrum and changes in their composition and size over time, associated with marked social factors. Hegemony, in a phrase, does not mean homogeneity.

Prandi (2019) affirms that 12% of Brazilian society with 16 years or more are loyal supporters and enthusiastic fans of President Jair Bolsonaro, unrestrictedly supporting his declarations by him since the beginning of his government: these are the so-called “radical Bolsonaro style person”. Not the other way around, 30% of the population did not vote for the President, they reproached their government and disagreed with their falsehoods and positions. The remaining 58% are distributed in different intermediary categories, oscillating between support and referral to the personal and institutional actions of the National Executive Chef.

Not that it refers to the first group, the “12% heavy”, which is enough to guarantee a concrete social base and guarantee legitimacy to the anti-democratic initiatives of the extreme right-wing politicians, such as their

attacks on citizenship, solidarity, or respect for otherness, to the environment, to education and to science. This group, historically dispersed in Brazilian society, found in Jair Bolsonaro an institutional instrument through which to express his voice. The figure of the President functions as a kind of channeling of his desires and anxieties of him (PRANDI, 2019).

Or radical Bolsonaroism is made up of 15% two Brazilians of the masculine gender; 12% female; 5% two nationals between 16 and 24 years old, 9% between 25 and 34 years old, 12% between 35 and 44 years old, 16% between 45 and 59 years old and 19% two who are 60 years old or older. Note, therefore, an increase in the ultraconservative ideological pattern as age increases (PRANDI, 2019).

The same trend of increase is demonstrated according to income. 5% two Brazilians with a monthly family income of up to two minimum wages unconditionally support the Bolsonaro Government. In the range from two to five, only 15%. Between five and ten, about 23%. On top of ten, it pays 25%, this is, one in every four cities in the country, this monthly family income bill can be considered a radical Bolsonaro. This pattern tends to be repeated no matter what schooling, but with minor variations, demonstrating the relationship between the neo-fascist political project and social stratification in the country. We found a group of 12% two Brazilians who finished Elementary school; 11% of those like High School; and 16% with Higher Education. Not that it refers to the ethnic composition of Bolsonaro style, this political project includes 5% two indigenous nationals, 8% two pretos and Amarelos, 11% two pardos and 17% two whites (PRANDI, 2019).

To conclude the profile, we look at the characteristics of occupation, geographic region and religion: 3% two Brazilian students, 8% two wage earners without a

wallet, 8% housewives, 8% two unemployed, 12% two who have signed work card, 19% two self-employed workers, 20% two lodgers and 32% two entrepreneurs. In the South and Southeast regions, 14% are loyal supporters of the President, a similar figure to the Center-West and North regions, falling to 7% in the Northeast. The sizes of the two municipalities and the difference between the Capital and the countryside will not be relevant for the alignment or not to Jair Bolsonaro. Finally, 13% had two Catholics, two traditional evangelicals and two Brazilian spiritists, 23% two neo-Pentecostals and 7% two without religion (PRANDI, 2019).

Thus, or profile Two 12% of radical Bolsonaro style persons are predominantly male, white, of mature age, neo-Pentecostal, with higher education and social status from middle to high, work as entrepreneurs and dwell in the South and Southeast regions. Praised by this organized group and well represented in sectors of the national elite, there has been a continuous degradation of the political environment in Brazil over the last two years, in which the weakening of the credibility of the institutions fosters, as the counterpart or strengthening, two collective desires for violent resolution. conflicts.

FOR BEYOND NEGATIONISM: THE EXALTATION OF THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP IN BOLSONARISM

For Napolitano and Junqueira (2019), or historical negationism, the following characteristics are presented: 1st) distorted scientific theses; 2nd) appeals to oral sensationalism; 3rd) decontextualises sources/documents/stories; 4th) it simplifies the reasoning for the linear causality of two phenomena; 5th) defends ideological and moral perspectives to adjust the world to the

desires of the personal/group, and not or vice versa.

A deliberate attempt to outline and conceal traumatic moments in society, as in the case of the Military Dictatorship, ends up fostering a kind of eternal return, once such collective experiences are not properly symbolized, not only preventing their significance, but also his judgment according to the moral standards of a people. Without clarification and punishment of two crimes committed by State agents, there is no possibility of understanding the committed errors, of educating the population in the sense of breaking with violent cultural tendencies – institutional or not – and of creating institutional practices that coíbam and are more resistant to the authoritarian return.

Together with denialism, however, it seems to coexist or that we will call exaltationism, it means, an attempt to persuade the audience for the good assertion of which it is accused. With this issue, non-enunciative sense, there is no acknowledgment for himself and for the group of two made denounced by opponents, as he has also made a public affirmation of these acts in a proud way. Not on a moral plane, there is a complete inversion of values: what is considered wrong, therefore, reason for shame and guilt, must be considered correct, associating with honor and virtue the two denounced. On the epistemic plane, in which actions and perspectives of the common sense, linked to immediate personal interests and not collectively reflected, seem to justify State attitudes, which must be ruled by impersonality, transparency, legality and collective legitimacy.”The mistake of the Dictatorship was to torture and not to kill”⁷, affirms the Federal Deputy Jair Bolsonaro in a disagreement with protesters in front of the Military Club of Rio de Janeiro, in August 2008. In 2016, the politician reaffirms his

⁷ All the pronouncements of President Jair Bolsonaro withdrawn for analysis in this section forum collected in Capital Letter (2018).

falsehood in the program: “Pânico”, from Rádio Jovem Pan. There are some aspects that deserve to be analyzed with greater attention in the short term.

In the first place, or use of the term “Dictatorship” by his own Deputy, so that he defines this historical period by seeing the affirmation that there was a *de facto* democratic rupture in the country in the period from 1964 to 1985. A word traces with it a perspective of the world. In this case, it has been taken up from a term generally used by progressive groups, whether from the left or from the political right, opposed to the military regime.

In this sentence, Jair Bolsonaro, still in parliamentary function, does not consider it necessary to hide the occurrence of the coup *d'état* and its violent political practices. I have not had anything wrong at the time, I would not have also today, if the same practices were replicated. When talking about Dictatorship, or political representative, therefore, does not align itself with denialism, but rather we are calling for exaltationism, through which it proudly and vainly acknowledges that the Brazilian State used violence against citizens considered enemies.

Second, the use of the term “torture”⁸ reaffirms what the military itself has tried to deny since the process of political opening in the country in the late 1980s, the public acts

of barbarism committed in Brazilian state institutions.

The cells of the Dictatorship leave, in this case, from being hidden and becoming exalted, normalizing practices considered abnormal. Do not cause more constraint. Differently from that, it functions as an affirmation of power, strength and virility. There is, here, a constitutive moral and rhetorical inversion: one can and must torture. The limits are withdrawn for the power of the State and direct human dignity to its nationals, guaranteeing only for those who can be considered citizens by state power and by hegemonic social groups. Finally, the desired State is no longer that of Law, but that of Exception⁹.

In the third party, he refers to an error of the Dictatorship: I will not be killed. Despite considering the occurrence of a misunderstanding, it is not a criticism, but rather an attenuation of the governmental actions of the period; perhaps at the same time as the acknowledgment of a presumptuous gesture of humanity and political concern of the military regime with the prisoners. If their governors and agents of the State were discouraged, they could be eliminated instead of “barely” tortured, because supposedly they would not be exercising their function: to maintain the order. It is assumed, therefore, that it was not necessary to worry about preserving or correcting political prisoners,

8 The Clause III of the Federal Constitution of 1988 states: “no one shall be subjected to torture or human or degrading treatment” (BRAZIL, 1988).

9 According to Agamben (2011, p. 13), “the state of exception is presented, in this perspective, as a quagmire of indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism.” Regarding its presence in the Brazilian political structure, Teles (2010, p. 13) highlights: “Second to the instituted logic, or legal order, is preceded by an order, a democratic, and demand, due to the risk of its degeneration, or establishment of another order, that one legitimized by ‘Constituent Power’ If, eventually, in order to suffer alterations or disturbances, it will be up to the sovereign or judgment on the conditions of abnormality. Consequently, more than one will also decide on the state of exception, defining here what is excluded from the order by an internal mechanism of its own policy: the need to maintain the order. The rules are related to an exception by means of their own suspension, so that the excluded is included in the interrupted order, added for another moment. We do not outline the promise of the 1964 coup: the restoration of the order, by means of a new norm, in a movement characterized as something provisional by its authors. Upon taking over the State, the military became representatives of society, identifying the government with the general government, expressing the sign of the National Security Doctrine and the State of Exception. Not Brazil, or the State of Exception emerged as a fundamental political structure, prevailing as a norm when the dictatorship transformed or undecided tops in a shady and permanent location in the torture rooms”.

but torture them. In parallel to the deliberate outline of the Dictatorship's death, he was also killed, besides being tortured (JANSEN, 2019), functioning as an implicit denialism, occurs in the haughty – explicit – affirmation of two made by two military governments.

What impact of the affirmation does not place the denial of its content? Or to legitimize for all your supporters that torturing or killing cannot be considered negative, since those murdered are considered public enemies or criminals. Apart from a moral and rhetoric inversion, it is an inversion of the legal norms of the Federal Constitution of 1988: one can and must not only torture, but also kill. Thus, or problem would not be supplicating, but living with their victims later.

Instead of denying the institutional practice of torture in the post-coup military governments of 1964, or presupposing an admission of guilt and shame at once – once it tries to hide these acts so as not to be judged personally and institutionally in a negative way, Brazilian President categorically defends the existence of the Dictatorship in Brazil and wishes for its reimplantation in the country. As an aggravating circumstance of suggesting the need for even more violent measures. It oscillates, therefore, between denial and exaltation of the democratic rupture. No second case, clam, substitute guilt and shame for ridicule and cynicism¹⁰. Let's see, below, other similar statements during Bolsonaro's political career:

1) *We will die a few. Police had to have killed a thousand* (1992, about the Massacre do Carandiru. Excerpts that we highlighted).

2) *He deserved that: pau-de-arara. Works. I*

am in favor of torture. You know it. And the people are in favor of it too (1999, Program: Câmera Aberta, of Rede Bandeirantes. Excerpts that we highlighted).

3) *Through your vote, you will not change anything in this country, nothing, absolutely nothing! It is only going to change, unfortunately, one day we will leave for a civil war here inside, and doing or working that the military regime did not do: killing about 30 thousand, starting with FHC, not leaving for outside, killing! Some innocents are going to die, all bem, all how much and war will die innocent* (1999, Program: "Câmera Aberta", of Rede Bandeirantes. Excerpts that we highlighted).

4) *The current Constitution guarantees the intervention of the Armed Forces for the maintenance of the law and the order. I am in favor, sim, of a dictatorship, of a regime of exception, since this Congress is more than a step towards the abyss, which I do not understand is very close* (1999, Program: Câmera Aberta, of Rede Bandeirantes. Excerpts that we highlighted).

5) *In the memory of colonel Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra, or fear of Dilma Rousseff [...] or my vote is sim* (2016, vote in the Chamber of Deputies. Excerpts that we highlighted).

6) *We are a Christian country. There is no such story of a secular state, no. The State is Christ. Let's go fazer or Brazil for the majority. As minorities have to be curved as majorities. As minorities adapt or simply disappear* (2017. Video on YouTube. Excerpts that we highlighted)

7) *We are going to shoot petralhada here in Acre. I'm going to throw these idiots to run from Acre. Since these people like Venezuela, this gang has to go there_* (2018. Politician

10 In Morais (2021, p. 23), we deal with these aspects in the following way: "For Tiburi (2017; 2018), populists often reduce politics to the advertising sphere, transforming their institutional images and their public talks into spectacles and marketing. It is an aesthetic of the absurd, normalizing or paradoxical and making it 'cool' or that before would cause shame to arouse the support of civil society. They are therefore anchored, not cynicism, as a radical destruction of empathy and two civilizing values, making intersubjective relationships unviable, underestimating sentiments and social conventions and preventing collective constructions of the common. In addition, we increase, we recurrently use irony to '[...] destabilize the opponent, causing the audience to laugh in favor of the speaker' (FIORIN, 2017, p. 221)".

Speech in Rio Branco, in Acre. Excerpts that we highlighted);

8) *This group, it will be wanted here, vai ter that it will be placed under the law of all of us. Either go out or go to jail. These red thugs will be banished from our homeland* (2018. Video broadcast for Avenida Paulista. Excerpts that we highlighted);

9) *[The police officer] enters, solves the problem and, will kill 10, 15 or 20, with 10 or 30 shots each, they have to be decorated, and not prosecuted* (2018, Jornal Nacional, of Rede Globo de Televisão. Excerpts that we highlighted).

As we can see, not in the first place, Jair Bolsonaro suggests that the Carandiru Massacre must – not in the sense of unwanted conduct – have been even greater. Reduce, this way, the institutional logic of public security to personalist, vindictive logic. No second, he affirms that the former President of the Central Bank, Chico Lopes, must have been tortured, expressing his explicit support for the practice of torture. It seeks to demonstrate that such a technique would be efficient in the production of proofs and legitimate for the punishment of offenders of the legal norm, placing the people – symbol of the doxa – as the moral guarantor, besides the audience to be conquered and represented. In the third party, it defends the outbreak of a civil war that could kill approximately 30 thousand Brazilians, once a vote would be an ineffective institutional process. Not fourthly, again, the terms of Dictatorship and addition or Exception Regime are used to threaten to date or Congress by means of an intervention by the Armed Forces. Not fifth, it exalts the memory of that one who was legally considered the main torturer of the military period: Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra. She

expresses, therefore, a pride in memory of her Dictatorship and her practices, in addition to praising the violence and the media that she represents. Not sixth, in a more religious life, I propose to bend the non-Christians to the majority of the Christians in the country and make them disappear if no oil adapts to the hegemonic perspective. With this, reduce the State to the logic of the common sense of representation, based on quantity, and we do not have inalienable rights of all groups. In the seventh, inciting or executing and exiling political enemies, anchoring themselves in death threats and planning or returning to summary executions and death penalty. Not once, threatened or banned two political contestants in the 2018 Presidential Elections, based on the personalization of the law for the idea of Ourselves (for example, “ours law”), the symbol of the majority, of the “city of good deeds. Lastly, in the ninth, he proposes a police award for killing criminals, in a new reduction of the public security institution to the logic of vindication and war, praising violence and summary executions. It also reinforces other two pronouncements, such as “violence is fought with more violence”, “criminal is not a normal human being”, “police officer who does not kill is not a police officer” and “Brazilian police have more to kill” (LETTER CAPITAL, 2018).

Before the emergence of social networks and digital media, Bolsonaro’s statements used to be given to corporate media. We are excited about, more than the denial of the Dictatorship, or the President continually asserts his allegiance to the political model established in 1964, as well as his actions, projecting as examples for public security and for political dispute in the country at present¹¹.

11 We complement this reasoning with Teles (2018, p. 71): “The background of militarization in recent history is the ideology of the internal enemy developed in the dictatorship and potentiated in recent decades. Democracy maintains the conception of public security as a war against or enemy, this varying between ‘bandits’, militants of social movements, black and poor youth, crazy people, traffickers, LGBTI people, indigenous people. In June 2013 and in other moments of conflicts outside the media

Such frankness prevents some of his voters from affirming that, at some point, he had lied about his political and ideological perception. I do not care about two 12% of radical Bolsonaro style persons, to Bolsonaro's "sincerity" or placed as a mythical figure. For this, project in his representative or supposed to defend gives truth in half to a decadent political system, demoralized, based on lessons and dominated by corruption, politics and morals.

However, despite attributing to his enemies the anti-political attitudes he defends, Bolsonaro and his followers position themselves as guardians of their own politics and democracy. Second thought, we did not try to destroy them; On the contrary, I suppose I defend the two of them who are true saboteurs. These, yes, authoritarian, violent and intolerant of difference. See the world for an inverted optic, due to the existence of a – attempted implantation of the – minority dictatorship. Or it seems to have occurred in the context of 1964, so that this political scene seems to be fundamental to anti-politics, because it justifies the violent actions by state agents, projects its supporters as protectors of the people despite the longing or deepening of the domination of two dominant groups and simulates democratic normality in the midst of continuous threats to its permanence.

To conclude, the Bolsonaro Government is based, in various aspects, on a radical antagonism to the Enlightenment humanism of the eighteenth century. Due to the privatization of the human condition, it destroyed the universality of the right to three rights and the dignity of two cities. Through the rhetoric of war, it contradicts political dynamics, guaranteeing the prevalence of two

due to the policies of containment (secondary occupations, "There will be no World Cup", "Temer, leave the residence occupation", fight for habitation), combined with police repression and praise of sanitizing power and peacemaker. It is created, on one side, or 'citizen of good', worker (or owner) and orderly, from another, or vagabond, vandal, drugged, rowdy, or individual outside the huts that delimit or possible authorized by the order. By means of the combination of the media with the perception of a force above the law, it legitimizes violence. The rule is imposed by the force (and supported by laws) and its logic the production of abnormal, pathological, in relation to which must act rigorously to cure it, eliminate it, at least, it".

hegemonic ideological interests without the need for debate, suppressed by coercion. For anti-politics, it suggests defending democracy, reducing the idea of people to the idea of homogeneity. Through violence, ridicule and cynicism, it makes negotiation unfeasible and respect for otherness. Instead of promotion of life, guidelines are in death exaltation.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

In our short essay, we intuitively discuss some questions that we consider central to the understanding of the current Brazilian political context. In particular, we were interested in understanding the uses of anti-politics as a political strategy. Either way, or how to deny politics promoting by violence can generate political gains for groups that say they are against politics. Before being elected president, Bolsonaro had served seven terms as Federal Deputy, exercising parliamentary function from 1991 to 2018. Along the way, he forged bridges between the military and political imaginary to position himself as an outsider politician (a voice that will not be given up). to corruption), now as a military insider (a political representative from the institution who would defend the moral order: or Army).

Therefore, in the first section, we value the possibility of considering the Bolsonaro Government from the conceptual point of view of populism, antagonizing us with this fated position of hers, not giving account of the understanding of the use of violence(s) as a tool. policy(ies). In the second, we made a brief discussion about the social representation of Bolsonarism. In the third, and last, we validate the contradiction between

the exaltation and denial of the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in Bolsonaro's speech from a set of pronouncements of the current Head of State of the country throughout his political career.

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